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Hedging with Futures and Options: A Demand Systems Approach 
 
Practitioner’s Abstract:  The optimal hedging portfolio is shown to include both futures and 
options under a variety of circumstances when the marginal cost of hedging is non-zero.  
Futures and options are treated as substitute goods, and properties of the resulting hedging 
demand system are explained.  The overall optimal hedge ratio is shown to increase when the 
marginal cost of trading options is reduced.  The overall optimal hedge ratio is shown to 
decrease when the marginal cost of trading futures is decreased. The implication is that 
hedging demand can be stimulated by reducing the perceived cost of trading options, by 
educating hedgers about options and by initiating programs like the Dairy Options Pilot 
Program.  The demand systems approach is applied to estimate optimal hedge ratios for dairy 
producers hedging corn inputs in five regions of Pennsylvania. 
 
Keywords:  Hedging, Options, Futures 
Introduction 
The correspondence between optimal hedging behavior and the demand for hedging has 
not been transparent in the agricultural marketing literature.  Authors such as Castelino (1989, 
1992); Paroush and Wolf (1989); Moser and Helms (1990); Park and Antonovitz (1990); 
Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson (1991); Castelino, Francis, and Wolf (1991); Briys, Crouhy, 
and Schlesinger (1993); Lapan and Moschini (1994); Netz (1996); and Lence (1995, 1996), 
and Frechette (2000) examined the role of basis risk within a price risk management strategy.  
Hirshleifer (1988) showed that transaction costs drive hedgers from the market; Simaan (1993) 
and Lence (1995, 1996) found that opportunity costs reduce optimal hedge ratios; Frechette 
(2000) showed how hedging costs affect the demand for futures, but none considered options.  
Wolf (1987) and Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson (1991) looked at the tradeoff between futures 
and options, but not their costs. 
A synthesis of these approaches leads to a view of futures and options as substitute 
goods.  Risk managers are demanders of risk management goods and are consumers of hedging 
products.  Other market participants are suppliers of risk management goods and producers of 
hedging products.  Each good has a price, which is determined by equilibrium between 
consumers and producers.  
The demander of a risk management good chooses a hedge ratio or quantity for each 
good to maximize expected utility.  Futures and options are substitute goods, from the 
demander’s perspective, and the price of each will affect the demand of both types of goods.  
The situation is therefore analogous to the consumer choice problem with multiple goods and a 
budget constraint, except that a budget constraint is not necessarily binding for the hedger.   
Producers may be competitive and may drive prices down to expected marginal cost, 
but expected marginal cost is unlikely to be zero.  Broker’s fees, transaction costs, opportunity 
costs, learning costs, and every other cost associated with futures and options hedging must be 
included.  For example, initiating a futures position in corn may involve a $25 per contract 2 
 
 
broker’s fee and $1000 set aside in a margin account.  If the hedger’s discount rate is 12% 
annually, then the margin account costs $120 per year per contract or $10 per month per 
contract.  Over a six-month horizon, the total cost from both these sources will be $85 per 
contract.  Additional costs of transacting and administering the hedge could easily increase the 
marginal hedging cost to more than $100 per contract or 2 cents per bushel. 
Within a demand systems framework it is easy to see that, holding everything else 
fixed, fewer futures contracts will be purchased by the hedger if futures cost 2 cents per bushel 
than would be purchased if they were free.  What is not clear is the effect on options. 
The tradeoff between futures and options was studied by Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson 
(1991), hereafter abbreviated LMH, but they did not consider costs.  In this context, the results 
of LMH can be reinvestigated and reinterpreted.  They start with a base case of unbiased 
pricing and then consider the effect of alternative expectations (on the part of the hedger).  The 
same framework can be used here, starting with a base case of no marginal hedging costs and 
then considering the effect of positive marginal costs.   
A reinterpretation of their model in terms of hedging costs leads to a reinterpretation of 
their primary result.  Their primary result was that options add nothing to the optimal hedging 
strategy in unbiased markets.  When futures and options are costless, their result is still 
correct, but when futures and options are not costless, the optimal (equilibrium) hedging 
strategy will almost always be a mixed strategy using both futures and options in some 
combination.  This result is driven entirely by the costs faced by the hedger, including broker’s 
fees, transaction costs, opportunity costs, learning costs, and every other cost associated with 
futures and options hedging.  The result is not driven by nonlinearities or non-orthogonalities 
in the basis function or any other changes to the LMH model. 
The importance of this result goes beyond academic circles.  Agricultural hedging has 
grown in importance with the implementation of the FAIR Act in the United States, and 
agricultural futures and options have moved from relative obscurity to become part of the 
national consciousness.  This research implies that hedgers ought to consider carefully the costs 
and benefits of hedging and to compare the costs of different risk management products before 
choosing a hedging strategy.  In most cases a role exists for both futures and options, 
depending on the relative price of each and the marginal expected utility gained from hedging.  
The demand for hedging products is similar to the demand for any other system of 
goods.  Understanding the whole means understanding each of the parts and how they work 
together.  Here the parts are hedging demand and supply, and the whole is equilibrium 
behavior.  This approach to hedging demand is useful for understanding equilibrium hedging 
behavior when hedging demand and hedging supply conditions change because of government 




The model used here is based on that of Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson (LMH).  The 
LMH notation has been adopted to emphasize the differences and similarities of the two 
models.  The purpose is to make it clear how the LMH results can be reinterpreted in a 
demand systems framework. 
The variant of LMH to be used here is the one where hedging decisions are conditional 
on the output decision.  This condition simplifies the presentation, and no new insights are 
gained by including output as a choice variable, beyond what LMH have already demonstrated.  
Another simplification will be that profits here will be considered per unit profits, which is 
different from but not inconsistent with LMH’s model.  The choice variables must be 
interpreted then as hedge ratios rather than quantities hedged. 
LHM select an objective function using von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) 
expected utility paradigm.  Kahl (1983); Berck (1981); Bond and Thompson (1985); Bond, 
Thompson, and Geldard (1985); Hirshleifer (1988); and Viaene and De Vries (1992) used 
Markowitz’s (1952, 1959) mean-variance utility, but evidence indicates that neither 
Markowitz’s (1952, 1959) mean-variance utility nor von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) 
expected utility can explain all the nuances of choice under uncertainty.  Both remain in 
common use and differ little in prescriptive value for a wide range of models, as shown by 
Meyer (1987); Tew, Reid, and Witt (1991); Hanson and Ladd (1991); and Simaan (1993).  
Expected utility is used by Lapan and Moschini (1994), Lence (1995, 1996), and LMH.  In 
particular, LMH explain why mean-variance utility is inappropriate for choices involving 
options. 
The hedger is assumed to maximize expected utility of profits by choosing a pair of 
hedge ratios, x and z, where x is the portion of output hedged in the futures market and z is the 
portion of output hedged in the options market.  LMH normalize by choosing x to be 
accomplished using short futures, so an output hedger will typically have a positive x, but they 
choose z to be accomplished using short puts (for the sake of mathematical elegance perhaps?) 
so an output hedger will typically have a negative z.  As in LMH, only one option strike price, 
k, is considered.  There are two periods in LMH’s model, with the current futures price 
denoted f and the terminal futures price denoted p when realized, or p
~, when treated as a 
random variable.  The options premium is denoted r, and the terminal option value is denoted 
v or v
~:  v = 0 if p >= k, and v = k - p if p < k.  The utility function u(.) is assumed to be 
continuous, monotonic increasing, and strictly concave: u’ > 0 and u’’ < 0.  Utility is a 





~)z – c , 
where b
~ represents the local commodity price with spatial and temporal basis included, and c 
represents costs per unit.  All money values have been adjusted by appropriate discount rates, 
suitably defined. 4 
 
 
 The hedger’s optimization problem is  
(2)  Max{x,z} E[u(p
~)] , 




~)] = 0 , and 
(3b)  E[u’(p
~)(r-v
~)] = 0 . 
The second order conditions are satisfied because of the conditions on u(.). 
LMH take the model further by specifying the nature of basis risk: 
(4)  b
~ = a + bp
~ + q
~ ,  
where a and b are fixed parameters and q
~ is a random variable with mean zero and 
orthogonal to p
~ (and therefore v
~, though they do not say so).  Profits can then be rewritten 
as 
(5)  p
~ = p0 + q
~ + p
~(b-x) – v
~z , with 
(6)  p0 = a – c + fx + rz  
as the deterministic part.  Their insight is that setting x = b and z = 0 satisfies the first order 
conditions (3a)-(3b) because the only remaining stochastic part of p
~ is q
~, which is 
orthogonal to (f-p
~) and (r-v
~), so that (3a)-(3b) are satisfied if E(f-p
~) = 0 and E(r-v
~) = 0.  
These last two conditions they note are simply the market unbiasedness conditions for efficient 
futures and options pricing.  They conclude that unbiased markets with a linear basis rule like 
(4) yield no role for options in an optimal hedging portfolio. 
 Reinterpreting the model in a demand systems context means treating marginal hedging 
costs as prices faced by the hedger.  The prices include such things as broker’s fees, 
opportunity costs, and learning costs associated with futures and options hedging.  They may 
also include perceived costs associated with uncertainty but not modeled by the expected utility 
framework, such as distributional ambiguity and nonlinear responses to distributional 
properties.  In truth, there are many costs faced by an atomistic hedger that make the net 
hedged price less than Ep
~ for futures and the net option premium greater than Ev
~ for 
options, even if the markets themselves are perfectly unbiased.  The major innovation here is 
the treatment of hedging demand separately from the market pricing mechanism (supply of 
hedging). 
 To proceed, consider a hedger who faces additional costs beyond f and r, the unbiased 
expectations of p
~ and v
~.  Call these extra costs tx per unit hedged with futures and tz per unit 5 
 
 





~)z – tx|x| - tz|z| - c , 
where |.| is the absolute value operator.  The absolute value operator is necessary because z 
< 0 in most cases for output hedgers, as discussed previously.  In a parallel manner to 
equations (3a)-(3b), the first order conditions can be derived using the sign operator, defined 
by sgn(x) = |x|/x for nonzero x, and sgn(0) = 0. 
(8a)  E[u’(p
~)(f-p
~-txsgn(x))] = 0 , and 
(8b)  E[u’(p
~)(r-v
~-tzsgn(z))] = 0 . 
Profits can be expressed as in (5)-(6). 
(9)  p
~ = p0 + q
~ + p
~(b-x) – v
~z , with 
(10)  p0 = a – c + [f-txsgn(x)]x + [r-tzsgn(z)]z . 








~) < 0 , for negative z. 
Following the logic through, the solution requires x < b and z < 0 whenever tx, tz > 0.  The 
markets themselves may be unbiased, yet the hedger may choose to mix futures and options 
simply because hedging is not free. 
The implication is that futures and options are substitute goods within most typical 
hedging portfolios.  Totally differentiating the first order conditions, as in LMH’s equations 
(11)-(12) under negative exponential utility, yields the signs of the demand slopes and cross-
price slopes (partial derivatives) -d|z|/dtz > dx/dtz = d|z|/dtx > -dx/dtx > 0.  The direct 
effects are negative, meaning the amount hedged with futures will decline as the marginal cost 
of hedging with futures increases, and the amount hedged with options will decline as the 
marginal cost of hedging with options increases.  The cross effects are positive, meaning the 
amount hedged with one product will increase when the price of the other product rises.  The 
cross-effects are also equal, proving the demand system symmetry condition.  A different 
version of these results was derived by LMH but not interpreted in this way. 
A useful result from the arguments above is that d|z|/dtz < dx/dtx < 0.  Options 
demand is more sensitive to price changes than is futures demand.  This result is consistent 
with the idea of options as a luxury good and futures as a necessary good.
1  The implication is 
that policy makers and market professionals wishing to encourage hedging ought to focus on 
options, not futures.  Reducing the marginal cost of options (including opportunity costs, fees, 6 
 
 
and learning costs) could stimulate hedging demand and result in a larger aggregate hedge 
ratio. 
To explore this issue further, we can derive the effect of tx and tz on the aggregate 
hedge ratio, h = x + |z|.  It can be shown that dh/dtx > 0 and dh/dtz < 0, which means that 
an increase in the marginal cost of hedging in the futures market (an upward shift in the 
hedging supply curve for futures) will lead to an increase in the overall hedge ratio.  Similarly, 
an increase in the marginal cost of hedging in the options market (an upward shift in the 
hedging supply curve for options) will lead in a decrease in the overall hedge ratio.  
Conversely, a decrease in the marginal cost of hedging with options will stimulate hedging 
demand, while a decrease in the marginal cost of hedging with futures will reduce total 
hedging demand. 
This result seems counter-intuitive at first, until h is considered to be a composite good 
made up of futures and options.  An increase in the price of one or the other component goods 
will always lead to a reduction in the purchase of that good and an increase in the purchase of 
its substitute; however, the demand for the composite good is not constrained to decrease.  
Here h is behaving as a Giffen good when tx increases and as a normal good when tz increases. 
The confusion is allayed when the aggregate price is homogenized: restrict both to 
move together one-for-one, so that dtx = dtz = dt.  Thus, dh/dt = dh/dtx + dh/dtz = dx/dtx + 
d|z|/dtx + dx/dtz + d|z|dtz, the sign of which can be shown to be negative.  Hedging shifts 
from options to futures as t increases because dx/dt > 0 and d|z|/dt < 0, but the total effect 
is to reduce the options position by more than the futures position as marginal costs increase.  
In aggregate, then, dh/dt < 0, which means the aggregate hedging demand curve slopes 
downward. 
Beyond this, it is possible to characterize the share of hedging demand comprised by 
futures and the share comprised by options.  The share comprised by futures is x/h, and 
d(x/h)/dtx = (dx/dtx)/h – (x/h
2)(dx/dtx + d|z|/dtx) = [(h-x)dx/dtx – xd|z|/dtx]/h
2 = (|z|dx/dtx 
– xd|z|/dtx)/h
2 < 0.  The share comprised by options is |z|/h, and d(|z|/h)/dtz = (xd|z|/dtz 
– |z|dx/dtz)/h
2 < 0.  Each demand share curve (or equivalently each demand curve 
conditional on h) slopes downward. 
The problem is compounded by the inadequacy of a simple marginal rate of substitution 
to characterize demand properties.  The usual marginal rate of substitution measures the 
variation in one good’s quantity that keeps utility fixed as another good’s quantity is changed 
exogenously.  Here, though, expected utility has already been maximized, and no change in 
quantities can keep it fixed without a corresponding change in prices.  Indifference curves can 
be constructed to illustrate iso-expected utility contours.  They are ellipses with a downward 
sloping major axis in x-|z| space.  The center of the ellipse is the optimum point, which 
depends on tx, tz, and the other parameters.  
Another way to characterize the demand for hedging is by plotting expansion paths in 
x-|z| space as tx and tz change.  When tx = tz = 0, the optimum point is (b, 0), as discussed 7 
 
 
above.  No options are purchased unless tx is positive.  As tx increases, the expansion path 
moves northwest in the coordinate space until it meets the |z|-axis.  Similarly, if tz = 0 and tx 
is positive, then the expansion path moves from the |z|-axis southeast to the x-axis as tz rises.  
The slope of the expansion path depends on tx, tz, and the other parameters. 
For most realistic parameter values the optimum is on neither the x-axis nor the |z|-
axis, but somewhere between.  In realistic situations, then, futures and options ought to be 
mixed.  This result is true even without any nonlinearities or nonorthogonalities in the basis 
relationship.  The futures contract cannot be said to be a “better” hedging product without 
reference to hedging costs.  To say so would be akin to saying meat is “better” than milk.  
Both are goods, and most people will select positive quantities of each in an optimal 
consumption portfolio, depending on personal preferences and market prices.  Similarly, 
futures and options are both goods, and most hedgers ought to select positive quantities of each 
in an optimal hedging portfolio, depending on personal preferences and market prices.  This 
line of research provides a foundation for choosing how to allocate hedge ratios between the 
two. 
It also yields a useful way to compute the value of a market’s existence.  In consumer 
theory, the consumer’s surplus is the total benefit accruing to the consumer because the 
opportunity exists to purchase the good.  Here, the hedger’s surplus may be defined 
analogously [Frechette (2000)].  If u* = max{x,z} Eu(p
~) , then the hedger’s surplus in the 
options market is ez, where u* = max{x|z=0} Eu(p
~+ez).  Similarly, the hedger’s surplus in the 
futures market is ex, where u* = max{z|x=0}Eu(p
~+ex).  The aggregate hedger’s surplus for 
both markets is exz, where u* = Eu(p
~+exz).  The value of exz will necessarily be greater than 
or equal to ex + ez because futures and options are substitutes.  The values will depend on tx, 
tz, and the other parameters. 
Empirical Application 
This section applies the concepts from the previous section to the hedging decision for 
dairy producers in five local regions of Pennsylvania.  The dairy producers hedge their 
purchases of corn using long futures and long call options, exactly the reverse of the LMH 
case.  The analysis is essentially identical in every other way.  The negative exponential 
(constant absolute risk aversion) utility function is assumed, which results in a convenient way 
to compare results for different levels of risk aversion.  Basis is specified as local price minus 
Chicago price.  Expected utility is then computed as a numerical double-integral over price 
risk and basis risk and maximized (again numerically) with respect to x and z.  The integrals 
were calculated by the trapezoidal method, and optimization was achieved by the simplex 
method. 
Data 
The data set is the same one used in Frechette (2000) and consists of (i) weekly corn 
cash prices collected by the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture (PDA); and (ii) the 8 
 
 
nearby corn futures price in Chicago.  Local cash prices were collected through surveys and 
phone calls for five regions:  Southeastern, Central, South Central, Western, and the Lehigh 
Valley.  The prices were collected and reported by PDA on Monday mornings before the 
market opened and the futures price that corresponds most closely is the previous Friday’s 
settlement price for the nearby futures contract.  If the Chicago Board of Trade was closed due 
to a Monday holiday, then the closest day was used, matching the information sets as closely 
as possible in each case.  All prices are reported in cents per bushel, for the years 1997-1998. 
Table I displays summary statistics and the covariance structure used in this analysis.  
The table shows that the covariances are negative and relatively large in magnitude between the 
Chicago price and each regional basis, indicating that the hedge ratios may be quite low in 
these regions.  These statistics represent actual results for the sample period, and the results 
represent optimal ex post behavior in the sense that hedgers are assumed to have known the 
covariance matrix before the sample period began.  Individual hedgers’ expectations will 
depend on the sample period and available information. 
For the purpose of exposition, rational expectations and unbiased markets are assumed.  
Thus, f is the futures price and r is the expected value of max{p
~ - k, 0}.
2   However, Ep
~ = 
f and Ev
~ = r are true only if a complete set of week-ahead contracts exists.  Week-ahead 
contracts do not exist in general, and hedgers roll over into the next nearest contract before the 
current contract expires.  The distributions of the random variables depend on the hedging 
horizon.  This problem was addressed as in Frechette (2000), by incorporating a constant 
discount rate of 0.2 percent per week and constant marginal storage costs of 0.5 cents per 
week.  After the adjustments, the conditional covariance matrix was assumed to be constant, 
and a bivariate normal distribution was assumed.  Ignoring the adjustments would cause an 
error that grows with the length of the horizon. Sensitivity analysis indicated that the variances 
changed by less than 4% when the discount rate and marginal storage costs were set to zero.  
The covariances changed by 3.6% to 9.1% depending on the region.    The character of the 
results depends much more on the coefficient of risk aversion than on the choice of these 
parameters. 
The coefficient of absolute risk aversion was set to span a range of possible farmer risk 
preferences.  Lapan and Moschini (1994) and Lence (1995) were used as a guide to select 
values for the coefficient of absolute risk aversion after converting the units as in Raskin and 
Cochran.  The relative risk aversion parameter in these studies ranged from 0 to 20 per year 
for a soybean farm.  Adjusting to a weekly value (multiply by 52) in cents (divide by 100), 
adjusting from an output-based quantity to a much smaller input quantity (divide by roughly 5) 
requires a final scaling factor of roughly 0.1.  The range from 0 to 20 corresponds to an 
approximate range for the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of 0 to 2 per cent.  Reasonable 
values to span this range were chosen as 2.00 for high risk aversion, 0.20 for moderate risk 
aversion, and 0.02 for low risk aversion. 
Hedging Demands 
 The computational hedging demand curves cannot be expressed analytically.  Table II 9 
 
 
displays the quantities demanded at regular grid points in (tx, tz) space for the Southeastern 
Pennsylvania region, with a coefficient of absolute risk aversion of 0.2 per cent.  Most hedgers 
face price combinations in the lower left corner of Table II because of margin accounts.  
Margin accounts account for a large portion of the cost of hedging with futures, but are not 
required for options hedging.  For example, if an options position costs $25 plus the premium, 
then tz is 0.5 cents per bushel, which corresponds to column 2 in the Table.  If a futures 
position also costs $25 but requires a margin account, then tx could be as high as 2.5 cents per 
bushel, depending on the hedger’s discount rate.  If tx = 1.5, corresponding to the fourth row 
of Table II, then the optimal hedge ratios are x = 0.3298 and z = 0.3417.  33 percent of a 
hedger’s corn purchases will be hedged with futures and 34 percent will be hedged with 
options. 
 The four other regions of Pennsylvania display similar hedging demands.  Figure 1 
shows the futures hedging demand curves for each region, assuming the marginal cost of 
trading options is 0.5 cents per bushel.  Figure 2 shows the corresponding options hedging 
demand curves, assuming the marginal cost of trading futures is 1.5 cents per bushel.  The 
Southeastern region displays the highest demand for futures hedging with a hedge ratio of 0.66 
when the price is zero and a cutoff price of 2.01 cents per bushel, at which the demand curve 
intersects the price axis.  The Western region displays the lowest demand for futures hedging 
with a hedge ratio of 0.20 when the price is zero and a cutoff price of 1.23.  The Southeastern 
region displays the highest demand for options with a hedge ratio of 0.90 when the price is 
zero and a cutoff price of 0.825.  The Western region displays the lowest demand for options 
with a hedge ratio of 0.29 when the price is zero and a cutoff price of 0.825.  The options 
cutoff prices are the same for every region. 
Little difference is observed when the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is changed.  
Tables III and IV display the demand for futures and options for the Southeastern Pennsylvania 
region when the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is 2.0 and 0.02.  One interesting result to 
notice from these tables is that for some combinations of tx and tz the demand for hedging, 
overall, decreases as the level of risk aversion increases.  This phenomenon occurs when 
options comprise a large part of the hedging portfolio and the optimal decision is to over-
hedge.  As the level of risk aversion rises, the way hedgers reduce risk is to reduce the hedge 
ratio, rather than increase it, because they are already over-hedged.  In summary, higher levels 
of risk aversion cause the overall hedge ratio to move toward the optimal no-cost hedge ratio, 
sometimes resulting in an increase and sometimes a decrease. 
The analyses above are based on the availability of an at-the-money option contract.  
When other strike prices are considered a curious pattern emerges.  Low strike prices are 
always preferred to high ones, leading to the conclusion that in-the-money options are 
preferred to out-of-the-money options.  This conclusion requires further analysis, as common 
practice indicates out-of-the-money options to be superior.  The mean Chicago price was 
255.22 cents per bushel, and Table II shows the results for an at-the-money strike price of 255 
cents per bushel for the base case with moderate risk aversion.  Table V displays the hedging 
demands for Southeastern Pennsylvania using an in-the-money strike price of 253 cents per 10 
 
 
bushel.  Options demand is higher for all combinations of tx and tz below the diagonal. 
This result depends on how fast the cost of options changes as the strike price deviates 
from the current futures price.  The marginal cost of supplying options away from the money 
may be substantial due to low liquidity.  Deep in-the-money options will have a high marginal 
cost and shallow in-the-money options will be preferred by input hedgers.  The supply curve 
for options at different strike prices is left for future research. 
The hedging demands discussed in the last section generate hedger’s surplus estimates 
that depend on tx, tz, and the other parameters of the model.  Table VI displays the hedger’s 
surplus estimates under moderate and high levels of risk aversion for each of the five 
Pennsylvania regions.  Hedger’s surplus is displayed for futures, options, and total.    All 
surplus estimates were zero under low risk aversion, indicating that the opportunity to hedge is 
valueless or nearly valueless for hedgers with low risk aversion.  Under moderate risk 
aversion, the Southeastern region had the highest hedger’s surplus at 1.7 cents per bushel, and 
the Western, Central, and South Central regions had a hedger’s surplus of zero. 
The covariance structure between the Chicago price and each regional basis is the main 
determinant of the level of hedger’s surplus estimated.  Lower strike prices generated higher 
estimates of hedger’s surplus, but changing the strike price did not affect the character of the 
hedger’s surplus estimates.  Quantitative comparisons are difficult to make because all surplus 
estimates are conditioned on the same fixed values for tx = 1.5 cents per bushel and tz = 0.5 
cents per bushel, which may vary with the strike price as noted above. 
An important qualitative comparison can be made between ex, and ez.  The value of ex 
is the value of the opportunity to trade futures, given that options are available to trade.  The 
value of ez is the value of the opportunity to trade options, given that futures are available to 
trade.  In most cases ex and ez were very small.  For example, ex is 0.091 cents per bushel and 
ez is 0.054 cents per bushel for the Southeastern region at a moderate level of risk aversion.  
The surplus values are very small, indicating that futures and options are close substitutes. 
Another qualitative comparison can be drawn between ex and ez on one hand and exz on 
the other.  The value of exz is the value of the opportunity to trade futures or options, compared 
to the alternative of neither.  At the moderate level of risk aversion, the Southeastern region 
had an exz value of 1.737 cents per bushel.  Compared to 0.091 for ex and 0.054 for ez, the 
1.737 seems very large.  This result indicates that hedgers place a relatively high value on the 
opportunity to hedge, but they aren’t particular about whether they hedge with futures or with 
options. 
At a high level of risk aversion hedging becomes more valuable to hedgers.  The value 
of exz rises dramatically to 19.295 cents per bushel for the Southeastern region.  The value of 
ex rises to 0.952, and the value of ez falls to 0.005.  The expected utility model tends to equate 
risk with variance, leading to a preference against both downside and upside variance.  The 
difference between ex and ez is due to the hedger’s assumed preference against variance.  This 
result indicates that the expected utility model may need to be reconsidered for studies of this 11 
 
 
sort in the future.  It might be replaced by a model that more adequately represents hedgers’ 
preference against downside risk without penalizing upside risk. 
Implications & Conclusions 
There are several practical implications of these results.  First, LMH’s conclusion that 
options play no role in the optimal hedging portfolio needs to be conditioned and clarified.  
LMH make it clear that they assume markets are unbiased, and they explain how biased 
expectations may lead to different results.  However, they do not consider that hedging is 
costly.  In most real situations faced by hedgers the optimal mix of futures and options will not 
be one-sided. 
Second, the overall hedge ratio falls when the marginal cost of trading options 
increases, but in many cases it actually rises when the marginal cost of trading futures 
increases.  The optimal position in those cases is an over-hedged position that declines as the 
level of risk aversion increases.  These counter-intuitive conclusions indicate that over-hedging 
may not always be speculative. 
Third, options hedging is more sensitive to price than is futures hedging.  Hedging 
demand can be stimulated most easily by reducing the marginal cost of options trading.  Such a 
reduction can be accomplished by reducing learning costs and management costs by educating 
hedgers about options.  It can also be stimulated directly by subsidizing options and allowing 
hedgers to learn by experience, as with the Dairy Options Pilot Program.  Targeting options is 
likely to have more effect on the overall hedge ratio than targeting futures. 
Fourth, futures and options are highly substitutable, though not one-for-one.  The 
hedger’s surplus forgone by closing one market or the other is small in most cases, though the 
hedger’s surplus forgone by closing both markets is much higher.  Low levels of risk aversion 
make hedging unimportant and reduce the hedger’s surplus to zero.  For high and moderate 
levels of risk aversion, however, hedgers are nearly indifferent between the optimal futures-
only strategy and the optimal options-only strategy.  The optimal futures-only strategy involved 
a lower hedge ratio than the optimal options-only hedge ratio. 
Overall, the relationship between futures and options still needs to be explored.  The 
supply curve for hedging products needs to be developed in more detail.  The relationship 
among the marginal costs of hedging options with different strike prices must be understood 
more fully.  Alternative decision rules to expected utility should be considered to account 
properly for asymmetric attitudes toward upside and downside risk.  Future research along 
these lines may contribute to a better understanding of hedging behavior and the development 
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Regional Price Covariance Structure 
Nominal Cents/Bushel, 1997-98 
 
    Price                Price      Basis         Covariance  
Region   N
*  Mean            Variance         Variance     with Chicago 
Southeastern PA 104  291.40               33.57      14.60           -20.07 
Central PA  104  287.40               14.51      37.51           -41.05 
South Central PA 104  284.80               18.54      42.73           -41.65 
Western PA  104  279.50               32.05      67.68           -47.37 
Lehigh Valley    85  274.70               34.81      17.93           -21.98 
 
Chicago  104  255.22               59.11 
 







Moderate Risk Aversion 
 
           tz 
 
    0.0     0.5     1.0     1.5     2.0     2.5 
 
0.0 0.6605  0.6605  0.6605  0.6605  0.6605  0.6605 
     0       0       0       0       0       0 
 
0.5 0.4772  0.6182  0.6182  0.6182  0.6182  0.6182 
 0.2611       0       0       0       0       0 
  
1.0 0.2467  0.5558  0.5758  0.5758  0.5758  0.5758 
 0.5849  0.0356       0       0       0       0 
tx 
1.5      0  0.3298  0.5359  0.5359  0.5359  0.5359 
 0.9016  0.3417       0       0       0       0 
  
2.0      0  0.0153  0.4118  0.4912  0.4912  0.4912 
 0.9016  0.7485  0.1287       0       0       0 
 
2.5      0       0  0.1118  0.4490  0.4490  0.4490 
 0.9016  0.7674  0.5140       0       0       0 
 
 






High Risk Aversion 
 
           tz 
 
    0.0     0.5     1.0     1.5     2.0     2.5 
 
0.0 0.6605  0.6605  0.6605  0.6605  0.6605  0.6605 
     0       0       0       0       0       0 
 
0.5 0.6421  0.6562  0.6562  0.6562  0.6562  0.6562 
 0.0262       0       0       0       0       0 
  
1.0 0.6185  0.6500  0.6520  0. 6520 0.6520  0.5758 
 0.0585  0.0036       0       0       0       0 
tx 
1.5 0.5851  0.6274  0.6478  0.6478  0.6478  0.6478 
 0.1022  0.0342       0       0       0       0 
  
2.0 0.5318  0.5959  0.6356  0.6435  0.6435  0.6435 
 0.1679  0.0749  0.0129       0       0       0 
 
2.5 0.4118  0.5455  0.6056  0.6393  0.6393  0.6393 
 0.3060  0.1366  0.0514       0       0       0 
 
 






Low Risk Aversion 
 
           tz 
 
    0.0     0.5     1.0     1.5     2.0     2.5 
 
0.0 0.6605  0.6605  0.6605  0.6605  0.6605  0.6605 
     0       0       0       0       0       0 
 
0.5      0  0.2375  0.2375  0.2375  0.2375  0. 2375 
 0.9522       0       0       0       0       0 
  
1.0      0  0.0005  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002 
 0.9522       0       0       0       0       0 
tx 
1.5      0       0       0       0       0       0 
 0.9522       0       0       0       0       0 
  
2.0      0       0       0       0       0       0 
 0.9522       0       0       0       0       0 
 
2.5      0       0       0       0       0       0 
 0.9522       0       0       0       0       0 
 
 








           tz 
 
    0.0     0.5     1.0     1.5     2.0     2.5 
 
0.0 0.6605  0.6605  0.6605  0.6605  0.6605  0.6605 
     0       0       0       0       0       0 
 
0.5 0.3896  0.6182  0.6182  0.6182  0.6182  0.6182 
 0.3515       0       0       0       0       0 
  
1.0      0  0.4735  0.5758  0.5758  0.5758  0.5758 
 0.8325  0.1532       0       0       0       0 
tx 
1.5      0  0.0809  0.5359  0.5359  0.5359  0.5359 
 0.8325  0.6350       0       0       0       0 
  
2.0      0       0  0.1768  0.4912  0.4912  0.4912 
 0.8325  0.7313  0.4319       0       0       0 
 
2.5      0       0       0  0.2667  0.4490  0.4490 
 0.8325  0.7313  0.6405  0.2456       0       0 
 
 









    Moderate Risk Aversion  High Risk Aversion 
    ex ez ezx   ex ez ezx 
 
Southeastern PA  0.091 0.054 1.737   0.952 0.005 19.30 
 
Central PA   0 0.053 0.242   0.317 0.005   5.02 
 
South Central PA  0 0.053 0.221   0.300 0.005   4.69 
 
Western PA   0 0.036 0.067   0.151 0.005   2.05 
 
Lehigh Valley   0.075 0.054 1.539   0.892 0.005 17.91 
 
 
tx = 1.5 cents/bushel, tz = 0.5 cents/bushel 





Futures Hedging Demands 
Moderate risk aversion.  Futures cost in cents/bushel on vertical axis.  Hedge ratio (futures) on 















Options Hedging Demands 
Moderate risk aversion.  Option cost in cents per bushel on vertical axis.  Hedge ratio (options) 
on horizontal axis.  tx = 1.5.  SE solid, C dotted, SC dot-dash, W dash, LV cross hair. 
 
 
















1 To see why, interpret an increase in tx as an equivalent decrease in tz and decrease in 
hedging expenditures, denoted y.  Similarly, an increase in tz is equivalent to a decrease in tx 
and a decrease in hedging expenditures.  Consider that dx/dtz = d|z|/dtx, and dx/dtx  is 
smaller in magnitude than d|z|/dtz, so dx/dy must be smaller in magnitude than d|z|/dy.  
Thus, the synthetic expenditure elasticity for futures is smaller than the expenditure elasticity 
for options, meaning futures are more of a necessary good and options are more of a luxury 
good. 
 
2 The base case for the strike price is at-the-money, but other strike prices will be 
considered. 